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I. INTRODUCTION
The current system to determine a fair use through litigation is
ineffective as applied to conflicts involving visual arts' because the courts
have misused the fair use doctrine.2 The first problem is that inconsistent
case law regarding fair use and copyright infringement fails to provide
guidance for artists.3 The second problem is that the judicial concept of
copyright infringement does not comport with the accepted norms in the art
world; artists historically have borrowed and copied existing expression
without objection or conflict.4 An example of how artists borrow from each
other is most evident in an artistic movement called appropriation art.5
Conflicts involving visual arts need to be resolved through a new
approach that would dispel the uncertainty of whether a secondary use is a
fair infringement of a copyright holder's exclusive rights.6 A delicate balance
needs to be struck between, on the one hand, preventing "piracy"7 of artwork
for pure financial gain where there is no introduction of original expression,
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1 I am limiting the term "visual arts" to refer to paintings, sculpture, drawings,
prints, and compilations of these mentioned.
2 Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007).
3 Heather J. Meeker, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine
Arts in the Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 212 (1993).
4 JEAN LIPMAN & RICHARD MARSHALL, ART ABOUT ART 6-7(1978); see also
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41
U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 477, 495 (2007).
5 ArtLex Dictionary defines appropriation as "[t]o take possession of another's
imagery (or sounds), often without permission, reusing it in a context which differs from
its original context, most often in order to examine issues concerning originality or to
reveal meaning not previously seen in the original." ArtLex Art Dictionary,
http://www.artlex.com/ArtLex/a/appropriation.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
6 See generally Meeker, supra note 3.
7 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
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and on the other hand, encouraging the production of new and innovative
artwork that reflects current cultural ideas and attitudes.8
This article proposes a potential solution to the fair use debacle involving
visual arts: Using the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) as a guidepost, artists may register their works with the U.S.
Copyright Office and thereby agree to mandatory arbitration with a panel of
art experts to resolve any potential conflicts involving fair use.9 The experts'
decisions would reflect industry standards and practices, while also balancing
the parties' interests to be protected from copyright infringement, thereby
establishing a consistent body of awards.' 0
Part II of this article describes the problems with judicial interpretation
of fair use in general and explains why the current judicial application of the
fair use doctrine does not work for the medium of visual arts. Part III
discusses case law addressing fair use and fine art and highlights the
inconsistencies in the case law. Part IV explains the system used by the
UDRP and how it would prove to be a useful model for fair use disputes in
the visual arts. Finally, closing remarks are found in Part V.
II. PROBLEMS WITH FAIR USE IN THE REALM OF THE VISUAL ARTS
A. The Current State of the Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright law exists to foster creative expression and dissemination of
ideas.11 A plaintiff may prove that another party infringed their copyright if
they establish that they have ownership of the rights at issue and that the
party infringed those rights.12 The courts inquire whether the defendant's
work evidences copying of the plaintiffs work, and if so, whether such
copying amounts to an improper appropriation of the copyrighted matter.13
8 Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 80 (1996); see also Meeker, supra note 3, at 211. These
new works may sometimes use another's work in whole or in part in the creation of the
secondary work. E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard
for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1473, 1479-80 (1993).
9 WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER, GUIDE TO WIPO DOMAIN NAME
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003).
10 Arewa, supra note 4, at 486-87.
11 Meeker, supra note 3, at 196.
12 CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 616 (7th ed. 2006).
13 Id.
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An exception to copyright infringement is the fair use defense. Courts
analyze four factors when determining whether a use is fair: 14 (1) "the
purpose and character of the use,"]5 which includes whether the new work is
transformative or merely supersedes the original;16 (2) "the nature of the
copyrighted work;"' 7 (3) "the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;"' 8 and (4) "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."19 The
fair use defense provides a 'privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright ... to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner of the
copyright."' 20 However, over time the fair use doctrine became known as the
"'most troublesome in the whole of copyright."' 21
Michael Carroll and Thomas Cotter argue that judicial application of the
statutory fair use factors is too difficult to understand and needs to be altered
in order to exist as an effective guidepost for users.22 Michael Madison
argues the real problem with fair use is the "emptiness" 23 of 17 U.S.C. § 107,
meaning that the fair use factors do not give any real direction, but instead
allow parties to make any number of arguments. 24 Carroll states that the four
14 The four fair use factors were originally made judicially and were later codified
under 17 U.S.C. § 107 in 1976. The seminal case in which the Supreme Court analyzed
and applied the four fair use factors was Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994).
15 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
16 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
17 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
8 Id. § 107(3).
19 Id. § 107(4).
20 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 12, at 776 (quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
21 Meeker, supra note 3, at 201 (quoting Dillar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d
661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
22 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1088; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright
Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2008).
23 Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396 (2005).
24 Id. Madison states:
[T]he statute itself has become not the embodiment of copyright's blended
nature ... but a placeholder for all manner of arguments about limits, many of
which have little to [do] either with "productivity" or "personal use" without doing
much at all to help courts, lawyers, litigants, and plain old ordinary folk reason their
way to solutions. It's what prompted Professor Lessig to characterize fair use as 'the
right to hire a lawyer' and it's the problem of the supplicant who crawls his way to
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factors do not help analyze the conflicts, but rather "serve as convenient
pages on which to hang antecedent conclusions." 25 As a result, fair use has
been used when it should not have been.26 Since the doctrine is used by
courts as "a case-by-case 'safety valve' for a variety of policy, fairness,
and/or personal autonomy concerns," the doctrine has lost its original
usefulness to protect certain uses consistently. 27
David Nimmer argues that courts first make a subjective judgment as to
whether a use has been fair and then later align the four factors to fit their
decision.28 As a result, a user does not know what is fair until a judge decides
it is fair.29 More alarming is the inconsistency in the law shows what may be
a fair use for one artist is unfair for another.30
There is uncertainty in the case law because the holdings are too case
specific;31 the case law has not established with any certainty when a use is
fair beyond that particular case. It is this lack of consistency that has
muddled the doctrine. 32 While the goal of the fair use doctrine may have
the top of the mountain to seek wisdom and spiritual guidance from the seer and
who asks, above all else, 'what is fair use?' Fair use has become too many things to
too many people to be of much specific value to anyone.
Id. at 396-97.
25 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1095.
26 Madison, supra note 23, at 397.
27 Id. at 406-07.
28 David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66-
SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281 (2003).
29 Sherri L. Burr, Artistic Parody: A Theoretical Construct, 14 CARDozo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 65, 67 (1996).
30 Id. Burr stated that "the application of the fair use doctrine can be inconsistent,
unpredictable, and incoherent."; see also Meeker, supra note 3, at 211. Meeker notes:
It is difficult to foresee where a court will draw the line between infringement and
fair use. This difficulty is exacerbated by the tendency of courts to require full trials
on the merits of the fair use defense. "Fair use does not assist parties, or industries,
in making ex ante determination whether or not to copy, and if so, how much."
Id. at 212 (quoting Jane Ginsberg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1926 (1990)).
31 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1090. "While the doctrine's attention to context has many
salutary attributes, it is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its
scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet users, and others who require use of
another's copyrighted expression in order to communicate effectively." Id.
32 Id. at 1105-06.
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been to protect some uses in order "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts,"33 in reality fair use further stifles creativity. 34
B. Fair Use and the Visual Arts
While uncertainty associated with judicial application of the fair use
doctrine is problematic across the board, the problem is particularly dire as
the courts attempt to apply fair use to cases involving visual arts. 35 Artists, as
potential fair users who want to incorporate another's work, are deterred
from engaging in a desired use because of the uncertainty associated with the
fair use doctrine.36 When an artist fears litigation, and therefore does not
create art, the goals of copyright to promote creation are not fostered.37 In
addition to fear of uncertainty, there are large costs associated with litigation
and potential damages, which also deter artists from creating art for fear of
subjecting themselves to litigation.38
There are two reasons why the current judicial application of the fair use
doctrine is not suitable to resolve disputes involving fine art. First, the visual
arts, and appropriation art in particular, are ill-suited to the judicial notion of
fair use because what the courts characterize as "infringement" is inherently
part of the creative process. 39 Second, courts have failed to recognize that all
art is derivative, particularly in the realm of appropriation art, unlike other
media to which the fair use doctrine applies. 40
1. Appropriation Art
Appropriation art does not lend itself to fair use protection under the
current state of the law.41 Appropriation art is not a new movement; artists
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34 Madison, supra note 23, at 393. This is discussed in further detail infra Part IB.
35 Ames, supra note 8, at 1475-76.
36 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1096.
37 Ames, supra note 8, at 1475-76.
38 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1096.
39 William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 1 (2000).
40 Yonover, supra note 8, at 80.
41 Elizabeth H. Wang, (Re)Productive Rights: Copyright and the Postmodern Artist,
14 CoLuM.-VLA J.L, & ARTs 261, 262 (1990).
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have been borrowing from each other for centuries.4 2 An example of
appropriation art is Pablo Picasso's use of Diego Velazquez's Las Meninas in
his Maids ofHonour:
43
William Landes explains appropriation art as a movement that:
[B]orrows images from popular culture, advertising, the mass media, other
artists and elsewhere, and incorporates them into new works of art. Often,
the artist's technical skills are less important than his conceptual ability to
place images in different settings and, thereby, change their meaning.
Appropriation art has been commonly described 'as getting the hand out of
art and putting the brain in.' 44
Patricia King said of appropriation art:
[T]he artist appropriates the exact expression of an idea; he has adapted it,
however, changing its character in the context of an independent artistic
creation. The artist incorporates the appropriated work into a separate
expressive form that is dependent upon, but not limited by, its past mode of
expression. The resulting product is not a mere copy which we may
42 To clearly illustrate my points, I am including examples of artwork throughout
this article to show the reader both how artists transform each other's work, as well as to
provide visuals to accompany the case summaries.
43 Diego Velazquez, Las Meninas, 1656, oil on canvas, Museo del Prado, Madrid,
Spain. Pablo Picasso, The Maids ofHonour (Las Meninas), after Velazquez, 1957, oil on
canvas, Museu Picasso de Barcelona, Spain. Here, the viewer can see how Picasso used
Velazquez's painting and transformed it into a cubist rendition of the same scene.
44 Landes, supra note 39, at 1.
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legitimately prohibit, but an entirely new expression which the law should
serve to protect.45
Appropriation artists do not hide the fact that they borrowed images from
others.46 In fact, artists challenge the viewer to discover the "genesis" of their
work.47 The artist removed the original work from its original context and by
doing so tries to force the viewer to see the image differently; they
transformed the original work.48
Transformation is one of the elements courts consider when determining
whether the use was fair.49 A use may be fair if the second artist's work does
not merely supersede the original work, but instead "adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning or message."50 The goal of copyright to promote the
progress of the arts is furthered by the creation of transformative works. 51
Copyright law does not exist in this country to reward the labor of the artist,
but instead assures the artist that their original expression will be protected,
while at the same time encourages others to build upon that artist's ideas by
transforming that original expression into something new.5 2
By forcing the viewer to see something new in something old and
commonplace, the appropriation artist transforms the original work into art
with a new "expression, meaning [and] message." 53 Appropriation artists
often use images that are easily recognizable as parts of popular culture.54
This aids the viewer in being able to take part in a dialogue and respond to
the secondary work.55 Viewer response to appropriation art is critical in
illustrating that the latter use is transformative. 56 If the viewer perceives that
the second work signifies something different from the first, the artist
succeeded in transforming the original work's meaning into something new
45 Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1571 (1984).
46 LIPM & MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 7.
47 I
48 Ames, supra note 8, at 1482.
49 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
50 d.
51 Arewa, supra note 4, at 544 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S.).
5 2 d
53 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
54 Ames, supra note 8, at 1482.
55 Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader
Response, 31 COLuM. J.L. & ARTs 445, 458-59 (2008).
56 Id
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and original.57 Further, in the process of creating appropriation art, which
uses another's work as a keystone, the appropriation artist challenges "ideas
about ownership and originality."58
While an appropriation artist uses another's work as a base, their creative
input comes through the transformative nature of their use.59 What is valued
is the appropriation artist's conceptual ability to look beyond obvious visual
cues and provide social commentary. 60 "The secondary artist's creative input
is her ability to 'see' that image in ways the average observer does not and to
recognize, whether or not the image is well-known, its potential as a focal
point for social criticism." 61 It is the appropriation artist's ability to re-frame
an original work both physically and metaphysically to create a discursive
community, which is deemed original and valued in this movement.62
Appropriation art often involves more copying-often copying of the
entire original work-which is not typically protected by copyright law.63
However, there is no difference between the practices of appropriation art
and the derivative nature of all art movements. 64 If copyright law prevents
artists from using another's work in their own creation, the benefits of
appropriation art-which include intellectual stimulation-will be stripped
from the public realm.65 Moreover, the appropriation artist will be left
vulnerable to an infringement lawsuit. 66 Disallowing production of
57 Id. at 455.
58 Ames, supra note 8, at 1482.
59 Id. at 1482-83.
60 Id. at 1482.
61 Id.
62 Heymann, supra note 55, at 458.
63 MARTHA BUsKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART 90 (2003);
see also Meeker, supra note 3, at 208. Meeker suggests that courts should not consider
how much of the original artwork an artist uses when conducting a fair use analysis.
Whether an artist only uses a small part of an original work or incorporates an entire
image into their work would be irrelevant. Further, case law will protect works that
parody if they attack the heart of the original work and take no more than necessary to
accomplish its goals. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994).
However, appropriation art is not necessarily parody, so it is not always protected.
Michael A. Einhom, Miss Scarlett's License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and Markets,
20 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 601 (2002).
64 Michael Spence, Rogers v. Koons: Copyright and the Problem of Artistic
Appropriation, in THE TRIALS OF ART 213, 213 (Daniel McClean ed., 2007).
65 Krieg, supra note 45, at 1568.
6 6 Id.
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appropriation art will also promote the idea that "property interests supersede
society's right of access to ideas and information." 67
Because of the restrictions that copyright law places on the creation of
art, there exists a fear about the continuance of appropriation art, and art in
general. 68 There are a number of reasons why courts are not tolerant of
appropriation art.69 First, copyright law has become more relevant in the
average American's daily life.70 Second, this growing relevance has led to a
growing awareness of copyright issues.71 Finally, these two facts have
"magnified" the disparity between copyright case law and art norms. 72 This
disparity indicates the need for reform in order to recalibrate how
decisionmakers approach disputes involving the visual arts so that the
holdings reflect industry standards and practices. 73 Sherrie Levine, a
prominent contemporary artist, commented on the difficulties that artists face
as a result of the incongruity between the proliferation of copyright
infringement disputes and art norms:
"The world is filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every
stone. Every work, every image is leased and mortgaged. We know a
picture is but a space in which a variety of images, none of them original,
blend and clash. A picture is a tissue of quotations drawn from the
innumerable centers of culture.... We can only imitate a gesture that is
always anterior, never original. Succeeding the painter, the plagiarist no
longer bears within him passions, humors, feelings, impressions, but rather
this immense encyclopedia from which he draws." 74
Appropriation art contains critical commentaries about society and
therefore is less like "stealing" and more like a "political speech."75 As a
different medium of political speech, appropriation artists76 should not be
67 Id. at 1579.
68 Landes, supra note 39, at 1.
69 John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REv. 537, 539 (2007).
70 Id
71 Id
72 d
73 Id
74 Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use
Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 373, 383-84 (1993) (quoting Sherrie
Levine, MAGAZINE OF THE WADSWORTH ATHENAEuM 7 (Spring 1987)).
75 Wang, supra note 41, at 263.
76 Not only appropriation artists, but all artists because all art is derivative.
1063
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
held liable for copyright infringement when their work transforms the
original.77 However, the holdings in the case law do not reflect this idea.
Instead, the misapplication of the fair use doctrine and judicial confusion
over art norms has muddled the fair use doctrine in the visual arts.78
2. All Art Is Derivative
The renowned American artist Robert Motherwell noted: "Every
intelligent painter carries the whole culture of modem painting in his head. It
is his real subject, of which everything he paints is both an homage and a
critique." 79 Whether consciously or not, all artists "borrow" from other
artists,8 0 and this is particularly true for appropriation art. Throughout
history, artists have used other artists' works in their own creations.81 This
borrowing can be exemplified in Marcel Duchamp's use of Leonardo da
Vinci's Mona Lisa in his L.H.0 0.Q.:
82
77 Wang, supra note 41, at 263.
78 Burr, supra note 29, at 67.
79 Yonover, supra note 8, at 121 22.
80 See LIPMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 86 ("Such innovative artists as Roy
Lichtenstein, Mel Ramos, Larry Rivers, and George Segal have reinterpreted famous
works of art in terms of their own personal styles, looking at the Modem Masters for
subject matter rather than for technical solutions.").
81 Id. at 54.
82 Leonardo da Vinci, Mona Lisa, 1503-06, oil on wood. Marcel Duchamp,
L.H.O.O.Q., 1912, altered reproduction. Duchamp added a mustache to a postcard of Da
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Art history is a "cumulative progression" of preceding art and artists
draw upon their knowledge of the past in creating their images.83 While
artists need to be protected from those who steal their expression without
adding any modicum of originality, most artists would recognize that their
work is part of a never ending, morphing, and symbiotic ceuvre. 84 Further, if
artistic movements are to develop and continue, most art has to be fairly
derivative.85
Even though all art is derivative, a tension still exists between the first
artist and the second artist.86 However, because contemporary society values
art and wants to encourage the creation of art, we want to protect both the
first and the second artist. We attempt to protect both by enforcing of
copyright infringement and also by allowing the fair use defense.87 "Because
art begets art, society needs to furnish incentives for artists to create."88
Further, an artist's work is meaningless absent contextualization of the
relationship between that work with others and with society in general. 89
Vinci's Mona Lisa. LH.O.O.Q. is a phonetic acronym for "elle a chaud au cul," which
translates to "she has a hot ass."
83 LIPMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 6-7. Lipman notes:
The reasons that artists, American and European, borrow from other art are multiple
and varied ... An artist may reuse existing images, along with other elements,
because they are available and suitable; and because they may give the borrower and
the newly formed work a place within the ongoing history of art.
Id
84 Yonover, supra note 8, at 80. McLean notes:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every
book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use
much which was well known and used before.
McLean, supra note 74, at 384 n.63 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1845)(No. 4,436)).
85 Berys Gaut, "Art" as a Cluster Concept, in THEORIES OF ART TODAY 25, 32
(NEI el Carroll ed., 2000).
86 Yonover, supra note 8, at 80.
87 Id. Yonover notes: "Because art progresses on the shoulders of prior art, we want
to protect the creator of the referent and the reference .. . Our goal should be to balance
their economic and personal interests very, very carefully so as not to diminish the sum of
art which enriches our lives." Id
88 Id. at 122.
8 9 Id. at 80. Yonover notes:
Art is both evolutionary and revolutionary. Art mutates according to the
conscious or even unconscious, sensibilities of the artist. That which has come
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III. CASE LAW
A. Judges Should Not Evaluate Artistic Merit
There are relatively few cases that address fair use in the visual arts
because most disputes are settled out of court, likely because of the
uncertainty as to which legal standard a court might apply.90 For the cases
that do go to trial, there is no consistency in the holdings to create
precedential guideposts for future would-be fair users.91 Many court
decisions do not incorporate art historical norms into their decisionmaking
process. 92 Moreover, the fair use factors that are helpful in other contexts are
not as effective when judging visual art. Further, the courts have evaluated
the artistic merit of the original and secondary works rather than evaluating
whether there was a copyright infringement or a fair use.93 As Justice
Holmes famously stated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke. 94
before is fodder for artistic creation and is linked inextricably to the present. Art is
history; at the same time it derives from history and affects history. In a real sense,
the cave paintings of Lascaux and those recently discovered in Chauvet are our
artistic ancestors. Lascaux's wooly mammoths relate to Picasso's bulls as the
archaic smile on the faces of Hellenic sculpture informs the enigmatic smile of the
Mona Lisa. 'What's past, is prologue.' But art, like history, is not static. Changes
come slowly or in sudden spurts. Sometimes artistic vision breaks out of the mold
and gives us a new way to look at the world. Still other artists refer explicitly to
earlier works. They appropriate them and, by adding humor, sarcasm, or comment,
send a parodic message to the viewer about what these earlier works now mean to
contemporary society.
Id.
90 Ames, supra note 8, at 1484.
91 Burr, supra note 29, at 67.
92 Ames, supra note 8, at 1507.
93 Id.
94 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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The judiciary has no competence to judge artistic merit.95 Christine
Farley notes that the courts try to avoid making aesthetic determinations by
substituting another issue to analyze in place of the real question they are
answering. 96 However, in the end, a court ultimately bases its decision on its
acceptance or rejection of the art's aesthetics, while pretending that its
holding is based on a non-aesthetic rationale. 97
As time and history, rather than courts, should be the arbiters of an artist's
success in achieving her critical goals, the need seems clear for a standard
more sensitive to the special public benefit gained through the creation
of... art and to the unique concerns present in weighing its effects on the
copyright holder's incentives.98
One example of a case that settled involved the artist Morton Beebe who
sued Robert Rauschenberg when he saw that Rauschenberg used one of his
photographs in a print.99
95 Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REv. 805, 814 (2005).
96 Id. at 836.
97 Id. at 836-37. Farley argues that the court in Rogers v. Koons based their decision
on their aesthetic judgments on Koons' work rather than upon the issue, which was
whether appropriation art makes fair use of a copyrighted work.
98 Ames, supra note 8, at 1507.
99 Gay Morris, When Artists Use Photographs: Is it Fair Use, Legitimate
Transformation, or Rip-Off?, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1981 at 102, reprinted in JoHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, 564, 565 (5th ed. 2007). Morris
stated:
Beebe was particularly upset by this unauthorized use of his copyrighted image
because he knew that Rauschenberg was a leader in the artists' rights movement
who had devoted time and effort to bringing the needs of artists to the attention of
legislators, the media and the public ... .Among the causes Rauschenberg has most
ardently espoused is the controversial proceeds right-sometimes called the artists'
royalty which gives artists a portion of the money realized when their works are
resold at a profit.
"You have been in the lead in protecting artists' rights," Beebe wrote to
Rauschenberg, "I was stunned to see one of my images so obviously borrowed
without recognition."
Rauschenberg replied, indicating that he was surprised at Beebe's reaction and
commenting, "I have received many letters from people expressing their happiness
and pride in seeing their images incorporated and transformed in my work."
Id.
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100
In the end, the parties decided to settle rather than litigate, not because
Rauschenberg conceded he participated in any wrongdoing, but because
neither party wanted to invest more time or money in the matter.10 1
Rauschenberg's attorney, wishing to make a statement regarding the fair use
of visual arts, explained:
"It is the position of Mr. Rauschenberg and Gemini G.E.L.1 0 2 that an artist
working in the medium of collage has the right to make fair use of prior
printed and published materials in the creation of an original collage
including such preexisting elements as a part thereof and that such right is
guaranteed to the artist as a fundamental right of freedom of expression
under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America." 103
Rauschenberg said of his work:
"Having used collage in my work since 1949 ... I have never felt that I was
infringing on anyone's rights as I have consistently transformed these
images sympathetically with the use of solvent transfer, collage and reversal
as ingredients in the compositions which are dependent on reportage of
100 Morton Beebe, Mexico Diver, 1974, photograph. Robert Rauschenberg, Pull,
1974, print. These images illustrate how Rauschenberg incorporated Beebe's photograph
into his collage.
101 Morris, supra note 99, at 566.
102 Gemini G.E.L. is a Los Angeles-based graphics workshop that prints
Rauschenberg's images.
103 Morris, supra note 99, at 566 (quoting Irwin Spiegel, attorney for Rauschenberg
and Gemini G.E.L.).
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current events and elements in our current environment, hopefully to give
the work the possibility of being reconsidered and viewed in a totally new
context." 104
Neither Rauschenberg nor his attorney believed that he infringed on another
artist's copyrighted work because of the requisite additional element of
originality that transformed the first work into something new.105 Further,
Rauschenberg recognized that he was working under the auspices of the
norms of the history of art, which has recognized that all art is derivative. 106
B. Cases Illustrate Uncertainty
In the few cases that have gone to trial, there is no consistency in the
holdings to provide guidance to artists or courts, which illustrates that judges
do not know what is fair use in the visual arts. An examination of three well-
known cases illustrates how courts reached opposite conclusions despite
similar fact patterns.
1. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures
Moscov ,iHutsoN
107
Not all courts are convinced that transformation is enough to excuse
appropriation of another's work.10 In Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures09 the
1o4 Id. at 565-66 (quoting a letter from Rauschenberg to Beebe).
105 Many of us have made collages, and few, if any of us, have thought that we were
infringing upon copyrights by using someone else's image in our creation.106 Yonover, supra note 8, at 80.
107 Saul Steinberg, View of the World from 9th Avenue, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE,
Mar. 29, 1976. Columbia Pictures, Moscow on the Hudson, 1984, poster. Columbia
Pictures transformed Steinberg's well-known magazine cover into their movie poster.
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artist Saul Steinberg filed suit against Columbia Pictures alleging that their
movie poster infringed his copyright for an illustration that appeared on the
cover of The New Yorker. 110 Judge Stanton rejected the defendants' fair use
defense that their movie poster evoked Steinberg's illustration and therefore
was justified as a parody.11' Judge Stanton stated that defendants' use of
Steinberg's illustration was not a parody and therefore not a fair use because
defendants' variation was not aimed at some aspect of Steinberg's
illustration. 112 Instead, the defendants "merely borrowed numerous elements
from Steinberg to create an appealing advertisement to promote an unrelated
commercial product."I 3
2. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures
14
In a similar case, the Second Circuit came to the opposite conclusion. In
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures,11 5 the famed photographer Annie Leibovitz
108 See generally United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
1, 1993); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); and Steinberg v. Columbia
Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
109 Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 706.
110 Id. at 708.
111 Id. at 714.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 715.
114 Annie Leibovitz, Demi Moore, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 1991, photograph. Paramount
Pictures, Naked Gun 33 1/3, 1994, poster.
115 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
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sued Paramount Pictures for copyright infringement. 116 Paramount made a
movie poster for Naked Gun 33/13: The Final Insult.117 The movie poster
depicted a naked and "pregnant" Leslie Nielsen, which was clearly a spoof of
Leibovitz's photograph of Demi Moore that was featured as the cover of
Vanity Fair in August, 1991.118 Judge Newman held that Paramount's poster
constituted a fair use.119 The court made a strained argument that the
Paramount Pictures poster commented on the "self-importance conveyed by
the subject of the Leibovitz photograph." 120 However, it is not clear the
movie poster was commenting upon the original work; it could be argued, as
it was in Steinberg, that Paramount was using elements of expression from
Leibovitz's work to create an appealing advertisement and thus infringed on
her copyright. 121
3. Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions
122
116 Id at 110.
117 Id at 111.
118 Id at 111-12.
119 Id at 110.
120 Id. at 114.
121 The defendant in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), attempted unsuccessfully to argue that their movie poster was a parody of
Steinberg's original art.
122 Mattel, Barbie. Thomas Forsythe, Food Chain Barbie, Mixer Fun, date
unknown, photograph.
1071
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Finally, in yet another similar case, the Ninth Circuit found that the
artist's use was fair. 123 In Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions, Mattel
brought suit against the photographer Thomas Forsythe. 124 Forsythe
photographed naked Barbie dolls in a series of comedic and sexualized
scenarios. 125 Forsythe stated that he created these scenes to "critique the
objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and to lambast the
conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects
because this is what Barbie embodies."1 26 The Ninth Circuit agreed that
Forsythe's use of Mattel's copyrighted dolls was a parody and highly
transformative, therefore, it was a fair use. 127
The holdings from Leibovitz and Mattel suggest that if the artist uses the
original as a source for commentary or criticism, the court will find a fair
use, as stated in the Copyright Act.128 However, this is not always the case;
compare those cases to three other cases involving the contemporary
American artist Jeff Koons, in which the contrary seems to be true: Rogers v.
Koons,129 United Feature Syndicate, Inc., v. Koons,130 and Blanch v.
Koons.131
C. The Koons Cases
The Koons cases best exemplify judicial confusion over what constitutes
fair use. This is because there is no consistency in the courts holdings.
123 Mattel v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
124 Id. at 796.
125 Id.
126 JOYCE, supra note 12, at 795.
127 Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806.
128 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The statute provides that fair use may be found in uses
reproduced for purposes such as criticism or comment. Id.
129 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
130 United Feature Syndicate, Inc., v. Koons, 817 F.Supp. 370, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
131 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
1072
[Vol. 25:4 2010]
APPROPRIATION ART AND FAIR USE
1. Rogers v. Koons
132
In the first case, Rogers v. Koons, the photographer Art Rogers brought a
suit against Jeff Koons for his use of Rogers' photograph, Puppies, to create
a sculpture Koons entitled String of Puppies.133 Rogers took a photograph of
his friend Jim Scanlon and his wife holding their eight German Shepherd
puppies. 134 Rogers later licensed the photograph to Museum Graphics, a
company that produced note cards with images of the photograph.135 Koons
purchased the note card and decided to use it to create a work for his
"Banality Show" at the Sonnabend Gallery in New York, which opened in
November 19, 1988.136
Koons instructed his artisans to copy the photograph into sculpture
form. 137 He dictated that the sculpture must capture the features of the
photograph. 138 Koons then added his own twists by painting the puppies
blue, putting daisies in the couple's hair, and giving the puppies large,
bulbous noses. 139 He titled the resulting work, "String of Puppies."1 40
Koons argued that his use of Rogers' Puppies to create String ofPuppies
was a fair use; 141 his sculpture was a satire or parody on contemporary
society. 142 Koons stated that he belongs to the school of artists
132 Art Rogers, Puppies, 1980, photograph. Jeff Koons, String of Puppies, 1988,
painted wood.
133 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303.
134 Id. at 304.
135 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
136 Id at 305.
137 Id.
138 Id
139 Id. at 308.
140 Id.
141 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
142 Id. at 309.
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who believe the mass production of commodities and media images has
caused a deterioration in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of
which he is a member proposes through incorporating these images into
works of art to comment critically both on the incorporated object and the
political and economic system that created it. 143
The Second Circuit rejected this rationale and held that it was not a fair
use because they thought it was difficult to discern any critique of Rogers'
photograph, even though Koons used the photograph to critique society at
large. 144 The court failed to realize that Koons was making a social
commentary; he was using the photograph as an exemplar of the banal
images that have become so pervasive in popular culture.145
The court worked through the four fair use factors and concluded that
Koons did not produce String of Puppies for any reason other than to profit
from the exploitation of Rogers' photograph.146 The court went so far as to
say, "In short, it is not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under,
143 Id. There are two camps that weigh in on the relevance of artists' intent in fair
use analysis. The first determines that the spectator has as great a role, if not greater a
role, than the artist in determining whether a work is art and whether it is original. This
camp would support the decision in Rogers v. Koons. Despite Koons' explanations of his
intent for the sculpture, the court did not see an original work of art that transformed the
source. Instead, they saw a theft of a copyrighted expression used for personal economic
benefit.
The other camp gives more support to the intent of the artist and uses Koons as a
representative of the idea that it is the artist who determines what is art. Spence, supra
note 64, at 217. Spence notes,
Koons's work falls within a tradition that plays with the authority of the artist to
determine what counts as art, and to do so by acts of appropriating 'found' or
'ready-made' objects, but this trial [Rogers v. Koons] became an almost comic battle
between the authority of the artist and the authority of the law.
Id. This second camp believes that the court is not in the position to determine what is
and what is not art. BUSKIRK, supra note 63, at 249.
144 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; see also Burr, supra note 29, at 67. Burr notes Justice
Posner supports dividing parodies into two categories: those that target the original work
and those that use the original as a weapon. Those that target the original would be
protected as a fair use, but those that use the original as a weapon would not be protected.
Here, the court seems to follow this rationale by categorically assuming that anything that
comments on an original is a parody. Since Koons does use Rogers' photograph as a
weapon to point out the banal images that pervade society, his use would not be protected
under this rationale. Again, however, Koons' work is not a parody, but social
commentary.
145 Ames, supra note 8. at 1505-06.
146 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
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but rather the flag of piracy."147 This holding did not acknowledge that the
fair use doctrine does not protect only parody; it also-not exclusively-
protects criticism, and comment. 148 Koons never argued that his work was a
parody, he argued for social criticism as a fair use, but the court did not deem
these points relevant in their analysis. 149
Various scholars have noted that the court in Rogers v. Koons acted as an
art critic in their analysis, and that is not their role.150 The holding in Rogers
v. Koons was met with much opposition because it was thought to limit
artistic creativity.151 William Landes and Lynne Greenberg think the holding
may put an end to appropriation art, "undermine artistic freedom, and retard
innovation." 152 The holding from this case infringes upon an artist's creative
freedom to choose their subject and method of expression.153 Instead of
focusing on the substantiality of Koons' use of Rogers' work, the court
should have asked whether Koons transformed Rogers' work, thereby
creating an original work.154
After this holding, it is unclear when and what an artist may use as
source material "when nearly every image she would find of interest
(commercial products, media images, and works by other artists) is protected
intellectual property and therefore off limits." 155 Willajeane McLean argues
that the court "failed to articulate a standard by which post-modem artists
147 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
148 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The statute states, "the fair use of a copyrighted
work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment ... scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright." Id.
149 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10.
150 Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-
Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 29 (1992). Greenberg continued to note,
"In order to be deemed 'proper' criticism, a work had best be a rather obvious parody of
the underlying work-otherwise, the court may miss the critical nature of the work
altogether." Id.; see also Farley, supra notes 95-97.
151 Landes, supra note 39, at 21. The court was correct in saying that Koons was not
flying under the flag of parody. He was flying under the flag of social commentary,
which is a permissive use under section 107.
152 Id; see also Greenberg, supra note 150, at 29. Greenberg notes that the court's
dismissal of Koons' justification that he was working within an artistic tradition of
commenting upon the commonplace, "effectively discredited an entire artistic
movement." Id. Further, "[i]t is not the proper role of the court to be making
pronouncements about what does and does not constitute proper criticism in the realm of
the visual arts." Id.
153 McLean, supra note 74, at 421.
154 Gs1
155 Greenberg, supra note 150, at 29.
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such as Jeff Koons can create art without the specter of lawsuits hanging like
the sword of Damocles over their heads." 156
2. United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons
At issue in Koons' second case, United Feature Syndicate Inc. v. Koons,
were four identical sculptures he produced entitled Wild Boy and Puppy,
which contain unauthorized images of Odie from the Garfield comic strip.158
The court applied the four fair use factors to determine whether Koons' use
was fair.159 The court held that his use was not fair because they thought he
knowingly exploited a copyrighted work for personal gain.160
The court gave little weight to the social criticism and therefore
transformative nature of Koons' four sculptures that were part of his "1988
Banality Show."161 He used the Odie character to "symbolize the cynical and
156 McLean, supra note 74, at 374-75.
157 Jim Davis, Odie. Jeff Koons, Wild Boy and Puppy, 1988, multimedia.
158 United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 373 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
159 Id. at 379-82.
160 Id. at 379. This was the same rationale that was used in Campbell v. Koons, No.
91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). In that case, Barbara
Campbell brought suit against Koons for using a photographic image on a postcard as
inspiration for a wood sculpture. Id. at *2. The court held that Koons infringed
Campbell's copyright for her photograph. Id at *8.
161 United Features, 817 F. Supp. at 379-80. When analyzing the first factor, the
purpose and character of Koons' work, the court did not address the fact that Koons'
work transformed the original, but instead focused on the commercial nature of Koons'
work. Id.
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empty nature of society."1 62 Based on the transformative, satirical use and
the holding in Mattel, one would have expected that the court would have
found the use to be fair. However, the court gave more weight to the
commercial-rather than artistic-nature of the work, and held that there was
no fair use. 163
3. Blanch v. Koons
164
Finally, in Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit took a different stance
from its earlier holding in Rogers v. Koons.165 In Blanch v. Koons, Andrea
Blanch, a fashion photographer, sued Koons for copyright infringement.166
Koons used Blanch's photograph in one of his Easyfun-Ethereal paintings,
Niagara.167 Koons took Blanch's photograph, Silk Sandals by Gucci, from an
Allure magazine article about metallic cosmetics, scanned it onto his
computer, altered it by extracting only the legs from the photograph,
modified them, and then superimposed them onto a pastoral landscape along
with other images.168
162 Id. at 383.
163 Id. at 385.
164 Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals by Gucci, 2000, photograph. Jeff Koons, Niagara,
2000, oil on canvas.
165 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). Blanch v. Koons was decided
after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, which might explain the more sympathetic treatment of the
artist.
166 Id at 246.
167 Id at 247.
168 Id at 247-48.
1077
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In coming to its holding, the court focused on Koons' intent for using
Blanch's photograph. 169 They explained that Koons' objective in using
Blanch's work was different from Blanch's objective in creating her
photograph.170 Koons asserted that he wanted "the viewer to think about
his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and images and at
the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives." 171 Koons
used Blanch's image "as fodder for his commentary on the social and
aesthetic consequences of mass media."172 Blanch, on the other hand was
trying to convey eroticism and sexuality through her photograph.173 The
court held the difference in their objectives was indicative that Koons' use
transformed Blanch's image.174 Koons didn't "repackage" Blanch's
photograph, but rather used it "in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings."l 75 The court did not fault him
for directly copying Blanch's image:
By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my painting, I thus
comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure
Magazine. By using an existing image, I also ensure a certain authenticity
or veracity that enhances my commentary-it is the difference between
quoting and paraphrasing-and ensure that the viewer will understand what
I am referring to. 176
Despite the fact that Koons appropriated Blanch's image, the court found that
the use was fair. 177 The court concluded by stating that "copyright law's goal
of 'promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' . . . would be better
served by allowing Koons's use of 'Silk Sandals' than by preventing
it ... "178 The Second Circuit finally recognized that it is an industry
169 Id. at 252.
170 Id.; see also note 143 supra for the discussion about the relevance of an artist's
intent.
171 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006).
172 Id. at 253.
173 Id. at 252.
174 Id.
175 Id. (quoting Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)). This case is often cited to determine if a use is
"transformative." Id.
176 Id. at 255.
177 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).
178 Id
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standard to appropriate art, and because Koons transformed the source art, it
was a fair use. 179
D. Current Case Law Fails to Provide Guidance
The holdings from the Koons cases illustrate that there is no consistent
standard to apply to fair use in the visual arts. Even at the Supreme Court
level, Justice Souter's analysis in Campbell v. Acuff Rose provides no
guidance.' 80 In that holding, he seems to authorize fair uses for the purpose
of parody, but not for satire, when he states, "If, on the contrary, the
commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in
borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly."18 However, he
continues to state directly after that there may be occasions when a satire
could be a fair use. 182 This confusion is reflected in the case law where
sometimes a parody is a fair use, and sometimes it is not; sometimes a satire
is a fair use, and sometimes it is not.183
Ultimately, Campbell's confusing holding creates ambiguous standards
that force artists to demonstrate whether their work is a parody or satire. 184
This is easier said than done because the distinction between the two is
contrived.' 85 Both parodic and satirical uses are transformative and both
provide a form of commentary.186 Further, the public benefits more from
satire than parody when artists can make use of a recognized work to criticize
179 Id. at 252.
180 Einhorn, supra note 63, at 602-03.
181 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). Other
commentators have followed this same line of thinking. Richard Posner believes that
satires are not fair uses when they use the original work not to comment upon it, but to
use that original work to attack something else. Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair
Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 67 (1992).
182 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
183 Burr, supra note 29, at 67.
184 Einhom, supra note 63, at 603.
185 Id.
186 Id.; see also Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value:
Appropriation Art's Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L.
REv. 1653, 1653-54 (1995). Badin notes that in the Campbell decision, "the court
ignored the transformative value of a creative work that criticizes without parodying its
target and allowed a presumption to remain against the work's commercial character,
thereby jeopardizing its immunity as fair use." Id.
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cultural values or politics.' 8 7 It is unclear how a parody that ridicules an
individual work provides a greater social benefit when it operates on such a
narrow scale.188 Therefore, the distinction between parody and satire is
arbitrary and not useful for copyright law. 189
Judicial interpretation of the fair use doctrine, as it applies to the visual
arts, provides little guidance to potential fair users for a number of
reasons. 190 First, these cases are unhelpful because the holdings are so case-
specific.191 Without a bright line rule, artists are forced to run the risk of
being subject to a copyright infringement suit, or they must attempt to obtain
licenses for the images that they wish to incorporate into their own works. 192
Neither are satisfactory solutions.193 No one wants to run the risk of setting
themselves up for a lawsuit. 194 Moreover, artists may be unfamiliar with
licensing procedures and copyright law and are not in a position to deal with
licensing requirements. 195 There is no method to force an artist to license out
their work, so they essentially hold a monopoly interest. 196 The result is a
"chill" on artistic production.197
A second reason why these cases are not helpful is because they focus on
countless technical violations of copyright law, which art norms regard as
"innocuous." 198 Copyright law's tests for infringement and fair use are
problematic in the art context because copyright law does not "recognize and
contextualize" the routine and standard copying involved in creating art. 199
Further, direct copyright infringement absent a fair use defense is a strict
liability offense, so even a minor unauthorized use may result in major
liability.200 "The predictable result is overdeterrence, as users tend to wilt in
187 Einhorn, supra note 63, at 603.
188 Id. at 604.
189 Id at 603.
190 Arewa, supra note 4, at 486-87; Carroll, supra note 2, at 1090; David Fagundes,
Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 152 n.64 (2009).
191 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1090.
192 Meeker, supra note 3, at 213.
193 Yonover, supra note 8, at 103-04.
194 Carroll, supra note 2, at 1096.
195 Meeker, supra note 3, at 213.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Fagundes, supra note 190, at 152 n.64.
199 Arewa, supra note 4, at 486-87.
200 Fagundes, supra note 190, at 152.
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the face of threats and liability, however dubious." 201 One commentator
claimed, "'if these copyright laws had been applied from 1905-1975, we
would not have modem art as we know it."' 2
02
IV. UDRP ARBITRATION METHOD AS A MODEL
The arbitration model utilized to resolve disputes involving
cybersquatting could be used as a model to resolve disputes involving fair
use in the visual arts.
A. The UDRP
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) was
established through collaboration between the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 203 and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO).204 The UDRP was established in response to
the inconsistent case law involving cybersquatting and trademark law. 205 The
UDRP resolves disputes involving cybersquatting. 206 "Cybersquatting
involves the pre-emptive, bad faith registration of trademarks as domain
names by third parties who do not possess rights in such names." 207
201 Id.
202 Landes, supra note 39, at 17 (quoting art dealer Jeffrey Deitch).
203 ICANN.com, http://www.icann.org/en/about/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
ICANN is a nonprofit public-benefit corporation with participants worldwide "dedicated
to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable ... It promotes competition and
develops policy on the Internet's unique identifiers." Id.
204 WIPO, supra note 9, at 2. WIPO "is an independent intergovernmental
organization headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, comprising 179 Member States.
WIPO's principal objective is to promote, through international cooperation, the creation,
use, dissemination and protection of intellectual property." Id.
205 Orion Armon, Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal of ICANN's Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three Years After Implementation, 22
REv. LITIG. 99, 107 (2003).
206 Id. at 100.
207 WIPO, supra note 9, at 3.
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1. Procedure
Those who register for a domain name must agree to the UDRP.208 One
aspect of the UDRP is that registrants are required to submit to arbitral
proceedings. 209 Trademark owners may submit disputes surrounding alleged
abusive registration of domain names to a mandatory arbitral proceeding if
they file a complaint online with an approved dispute resolution provider.210
The complainant211 must file a complaint against the respondent212 that
asserts and subsequently proves (1) the respondent's domain name "is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights;" (2) the respondent "has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect [to] the domain name;" and (3) "the [respondent's]
domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith."213 Once the
complaint is filed, the respondent has twenty days to respond.214 If the
respondent does not respond, the panel makes a decision based upon the
complaint filed online and in hard copy.215 There is no oral hearing of the
complaint.216 If the complainant successfully proves the three required
elements, the panel will order that the domain name be transferred to the
complainant. 217 "Neither monetary nor injunctive relief is available." 218
Each party, in their complaint or response, can specify whether they
prefer a one-member panel or a three-member panel.219 The panelists are
selected based upon their "reputations, impartiality, sound judgment and
208 Id. at 5.
209 Id
210 Id
211 Id. at 9. "The complainant is any person or entity, claiming trademark or service
mark rights, who initiates a complaint concerning a domain name registration in
accordance with the UDRP." Id.
212 "The respondent is the holder of the domain name registration against which a
complaint is initiated." Id.
213 WIPO, supra note 9, at 7.
214 ICANN, Rules for Unform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
215 Id.
216 WIPO, supra note 9, at 14.
217 Ian Barker, Thoughts of an Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioner on an
International ADR Regime for Repatriation of Cultural Property and Works of Art, in
ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, 483, 486-87 (Barbara T.
Hoffman ed., 2006).
218 WIPO, supra note 9, at 14.
2191d at 11.
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experience as decisionmakers, as well as for their substantive experience in
the areas of intellectual property law, electronic commerce and the
Internet." 220 To ensure that decisions are consistent, "the WIEPO Center
provides its panelists with a standard decision format," copies of new
decisions on a daily basis, an index of UDRP decisions, an online forum,
meetings and workshops, and procedural support.221 The panel reviews the
complaint and response, and issues a decision within fourteen days, which "is
published to the parties within three calendar days after the decision [was]
made," and it takes effect ten days later unless judicial proceedings have
begun.222
2. Judicial Proceedings
UDRP policy does not preclude either party from bringing their claim to
court.223 "The UDRP is not meant to replace litigation," like conventional
arbitration, but instead serves as an additional forum to resolve disputes with
a right to appeal to the courts. 224 Either party may bring suit in court "before,
during, or after a UDRP proceeding" to challenge the decision.225 After the
panel issues its decision, it waits ten days until the binding decision is
implemented. 226 If during that ten day period, the panel receives official
documentation that a party has commenced a lawsuit, it will not implement
the panel's decision and will not take further action until alerted to do so.22 7
WIPO notes that in practice the parties rarely bring their cases in front of any
court.228
3. Advantages of the UDRP
There are a number of advantages that the JDRP has over judicial
determinations. 229 First, the UDRP policy was established because many of
220 Id.
221 Id
222 Armon, supra note 205, at 121.
223 WIPO, supra note 9, at 6.
224 David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions,
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 51-52 (2001).
225 WIPO, supra note 9, at 6.
226 Id. at 14.
227 ICANN, supra note 214.
228 WIPO, supra note 9, at 6.
229 Id. at 3-7.
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the internet domain name disputes were international, and so courts were not
always able to provide an effective solution to the problem.230 Unlike courts,
the UDRP "provides a single mechanism for resolving a domain name
dispute regardless of where the registrar, the domain name registrant, or the
complaining trademark owner is located." 231 The "UDRP panels base their
decisions on the policy" and only consider legal rules occasionally if
relevant. 232 Second, litigation is slow and expensive, and the arbitral format
is a quicker and less expensive way to solve any disputes.233 The UDRP
procedure is time and cost-effective, especially considering disputes that take
place on an international stage. 234 WIPO reports that cases are normally
concluded within two months of filing and the fees are fixed and
moderate. 235 Third, "[a]ny national law ... is subservient to the policy." 236 A
fourth advantage is the "mandatory implementation of [the] decision." 237
"There are no international enforcement issues, as registrars are obliged to
take the necessary steps to enforce any UDRP transfer decisions." 238 A final
advantage of the UDRP-and most relevant to this discussion-is that the
panel members are comprised of decisionmakers with "substantive
experience in the areas of intellectual property law, electronic commerce, and
the Internet." 239
4. Differences Between the UDRP and Conventional Arbitration
The UDRP differs "from conventional arbitration in a number of
ways." 240 First, "participation in [arbitral] proceedings is mandatory for
domain name registrants" as opposed to being a process entered into
voluntarily by the participants. 24 1 Second, "UDRP decisions are not
binding," whereas traditional arbitral awards are binding.242 Under traditional
2 30 Id. at 3.
231 Id. at 5.
232 Sorkin, supra note 224, at 50-51.
233 WIPO, supra note 9, at 3.
234 Id. at 5-6.
235 Id. at 6.
236 Barker, supra note 217, at 487.
237 WIPO, supra note 9, at 6.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 11.
240 Sorkin, supra note 224, at 41.
241 Id. at 41-42.
242 Id. at 42.
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arbitration, the parties trade their "right to appeal for a speedier, less
expensive" process where it is certain there will be a resolution. 243 Under the
UDRP, a losing party can block implementation of the holding by filing a
lawsuit.244 Third, UDRP proceedings are conducted almost exclusively
online through submission of documents, and live hearings are rare.245
B. Rationale for Enactment of the DRPVA
What makes the UDRP successful is that it is an arbitral system that
addresses a specific field, utilizing experts from that area. The arbitration
model as exemplified in the UDRP could serve as a guide to resolve fair use
disputes for visual arts.246 I propose that those who register for a copyright
with the Copyright Office must agree to the Dispute Resolution Procedure
for the Visual Arts (DRPVA). 247
1. Expert Arbiters
An arbitral tribunal would be able to provide an effective and clear
resolution to fair use disputes in the visual arts for a number of reasons. 248
First, the pool of arbitrators would all be experts in the field of fair use as it
applies to the visual arts.249 The arbitrator's expertise in the arts would allow
them to reach conclusions that reflect standards in the industry for what
should and should not be an infringing use.250 The "ordinary observer" test
utilized by courts is ill-suited for disputes involving art, because the
243 JAMS Ethics Guidelines for Arbitrators, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHics: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 307, 307 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
244 Sorkin, supra note 224, at 42.
245 Id.
246 David Nimmer wrote a proposed amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 107 to clarify the
fair use doctrine in general. He named his Act, "The Fair Use Determination Given
Expeditiously under the Statutory Indicia for Calibrating Liability and Enforcement Act
('The FUDGESICLE Act')." David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use
Determinations, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 12 (2006). In his proposal, he uses an
arbitral panel to resolve the disputes. His proposal is not specific to the visual arts and it
places the burden on the potential fair user to bring the claim, rather than on the source
artist as proposed in this article.
247 WIpo, supra note 9, at 5. The UDRPVA does not exist; this is my proposed
solution.
2 4 8 PILLIP CAPPER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 2 (3d ed. 2004).
249 Sorkin, supra note 224, at 38.
250 Id. at 38.
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decisionmaker needs "to possess the knowledge of art history necessary to
assess the relative uniqueness of the [artist's] artistic expression." 251
The case law in this area illustrates that there is a disconnect between the
court's perception of the creative process and the reality that all art is
derivative.252 When determining whether a copyright infringement has
occurred, courts have focused their analysis on the two works at issue and
not upon the broader context in which the works were created.253 By limiting
their gaze to a straight comparison between the two works, the courts make
"questionable assumptions and rationalizations . . . that rely on fairly
contorted theories of access rather than [on] the potential that both might
arise from common sources or traditions in the broader cultural context." 254
By not contextualizing art within the norms of the history of artistic creation,
courts based their decisions on the assumption that borrowing from another
artist is verboten and that the source work was created without reference to,
guidance, or inspiration from any other art.255
Unlike the courts, an arbitral panel of art experts would bridge the
concept of copyright infringement with the concept that all art is
derivative.256 By doing so, the arbitral panel will be able to distinguish cases
that involve true theft of an artist's expression from those cases where an
artist merely appropriates and transforms a source artist's work, thereby
creating an original piece of art that adds "new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings." 257 Transforming and creating new art is
the "type of activity that fair use doctrine intends to protect" in order to
251 Donald S. Chisum, Copyright Law and the Artist, in LAW AND THE VISUAL ARTS
117, 121 (Leonard D. DuBoff & Mary Ann Crawford DuBoff eds., 1974).
252 Arewa, supra note 4, at 488.
253 Id. at 530.
254 Id. at 530-31.
255 Id. at 551.
256 See Ferguson v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (demonstrating that a panel of experts has been successfully utilized in the
film and television industries). The arbitrators are "Writers Guild members with credit
arbitration experience or with at least three screenplay credits of their own." Id. at 1387.
The fact that the arbiters are also members of the Guild ensures that they have firsthand
knowledge of the industry and its intricacies. The court in Ferguson stated that even
though judges are able to assess the parties' arguments, that "the credit-determination
process can be handled both more skillfully, more expeditiously, and more economically
by Writers Guild arbitration committees than by courts." Id. at 1389.
257 Pierre N. Leval, Comment, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990).
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enrich society.258 The expert arbitral panel would refine the narrative of what
constitutes authorship and accepted copying in the art world.259
2. International Acceptance ofArbitral Awards
A second rationale for enacting the DRPVA is that there is international
acceptance of arbitral tribunals, which would be helpful to solve art disputes,
which often cross not only state jurisdictions, but national ones as well. 260 An
arbitral tribunal operates across a variety of legal systems.261 Further, the
arbitral awards are enforceable worldwide.262 The New York Convention
states that an award from an arbitral tribunal in one country can be enforced
in any other country that subscribes to the convention. 263
3. Cost
A third benefit would be that like the UDRP, the arbitral process under
the DRPVA would be quicker and cheaper than conventional litigation.264
Litigation involves large expenditures of money that artists may not be
capable of making so they do not pursue a suit no matter how meritorious
their claims. 265 One scholar noted that the UDRP has been successful in
fulfilling its promise to provide an inexpensive and quick method of dispute
resolution. 266
2 58 Id.
259 Arewa, supra note 4, at 551.
260 Barker, supra note 217, at 484.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 483.
263 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
717 (5th Cir. 2009) (rehearing en banc); see also Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a
Mediation/Arbitration Commission to Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or
Looted During World War II, 10 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 27, 42 (1999). Pell
notes that the art market has become increasingly global since art moves between
museums and galleries for sale and exhibition. Id.
264 WIPO, supra note 9, at 5.
265 Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap Between Morality and Jurisprudence: The Use of
Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen Art, 3 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 295, 314 (2003).
266 Armon, supra note 205, at 111-12. Armon notes that "the UDRP costs from
$750 to $1,500 for a single panelist to resolve a dispute over a single domain name." Id
at 112. The WIPO guide states that cases filed with the center are normally concluded
within two months. WIPO, supra note 9, at 6.
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4. Claimant Bears Burden ofProof
A fourth advantage would be that the registrant copyright owner bears
the burden of proving that their copyright has been infringed by an unfair
use.267 This would serve a number of purposes. Shifting the burden to the
copyright owner is the most efficient option. In the alternative, to expect an
artist to contact every artist who inspired them and to obtain permission from
these artists to use their work as social commentary is unrealistic. It would be
impossible to contact every source artist, and further, it is unlikely that a
source artist would agree to the use.268 Instead, by placing the burden on the
source artist, they might be more thoughtful and discerning as to whether the
secondary artist's use truly is unfair before starting legal proceedings. This
would lessen the number of disputes and allow for unfettered creation.
Shifting the burden to the source artist also makes sense because the
source artist best knows whether infringement to his copyright has
occurred.269 Therefore it would not be a problem to ask the source artist to
bear the burden of proving how the secondary artist has infringed his
copyright. 270 It is a delicate balance to strike because too much protection of
the source artist could dampen creativity out of fear of infringement, but too
much protection of the secondary artist could cause the source artist to lose
the incentive to create if they lose their right to control derivative works.271
5. Establishment of Uniformity
Finally, an arbitral tribunal would establish a uniform method for
disseminating information about what is a fair use and what is not.272 Absent
an arbitral system, the variety in the case law does not provide any real
solutions for the artist. Since case law does not provide any guidance,
controversies arise and artists must get involved in timely and costly
267 WjpO, supra note 9, at 9; see also Nimmer, supra note 246. Nimmer instead
proposes in his non-binding arbitration act that the burden be placed on the secondary
artist who wishes to use the source artist's work. Id. at 12-15. As described here, this is
not the most efficient solution to the problem.
268 Landes, supra note 39, at 22.
269 Yonover, supra note 8, at 120.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 122.
272 Pell, supra note 263, at 53.
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litigation. 273 The outcome of a particular case turns on the happenstance of
where an artist lives and the case law that accompanies that jurisdiction. 274
Therefore, where a use might be considered fair in one artist's jurisdiction, it
might be considered unfair in the jurisdiction where the source artist
resides.275 In contrast, the arbitral tribunal would establish a body of
precedential awards that would provide ex ante guidance to artists who need
clarification of whether a use is fair. The panel would refer to prior awards to
ensure that their decisions are consistent. 276 Over time, the DRPVA will
come to serve as an information center for artists. By reviewing past awards,
potential claimants and respondents could determine whether a use is fair or
a copyright infringement without even having to submit to arbitral review.
C. UDRP as a Model
1. Registration and Submitting Disputes and Responses
Agreement to the DRPVA would include agreement to participate in
binding arbitral proceedings if any fair use disputes were to arise. 277 Under
the DRPVA, the complainant would be the owner of the registered copyright
and the respondent would be the secondary user.278 Like in the UDRP,
copyright owners would have to meet a number of criteria before they could
file a complaint with DRPVA.279 First, the art registered by the copyright
owner must be "identical or confusingly similar" to the secondary artist's
work.280 Second, the secondary artist must not have a registered copyright in
273 Id
274 Id. at 44.
275 Id. at 44-45.
276 WIPO, supra note 9, at 11.
277 Barker, supra note 217, at 487. At the end of his article discussing the role of
ADR in repatriation lawsuits involving Nazi looted artwork, Barker suggests that "[i]t
may be possible to establish a 'policy' for art cultural property disputes which, like the
ICANN policy, incorporates a general agreement as to the appropriate legal framework
under which any proposed arbitration system might operate." Id.
278 This would be different from the UDRP process. Under that process, the holder
of the domain name is the respondent, rather than the complainant as in the DRPVA. See
WIPO, supra note 9, at 9.
279 Id. at 7.
280 Id
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their work.281 Third, the copyright owner must show that the secondary use
infringes their copyright and the fair use defense does not apply.282 For
example, a secondary work that is a direct copy and has not transformed the
original work would violate this provision.
Once establishing the three criteria, copyright owners could submit
disputes surrounding an alleged unfair use to the panel.283 The complainant
would submit their complaint to the dispute resolution provider electronically
and in hard copy.284 The respondent would then have twenty days to respond
to the complaint in the same manner.285 Going forward, the single-member
or three-member panel of arbitrators would be selected from a large pool
based upon their expertise in the areas of fair use and the visual arts.286 There
are many intricacies and quirks particular to the industry, so specialists with
knowledge of the norms in the art field are necessary for an equitable
decision. 287 The appointment of experts allows both parties to feel
comfortable that the panel has the ability and knowledge to make a just
award.288 The arbitrators would be updated daily on new decisions so as to
ensure consistency amongst awards.289
281 Id. If they already have a registered copyright this would indicate that the
copyright office determined that their work was a new expression worthy of protection
and therefore the basis for a dispute would be moot.
282 Id.
283 WIPO, supra note 9, at 7.
2 8 4 DAViD LINDsAY, INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME LAW: ICANN AND THE UDRP
135 (2007).
285 WIPO, supra note 9, at 8.
286 Id. at 11.
287 Sorkin, supra note 224, at 38.
288 Keim, supra note 265, at 308. Keim notes: "arbitration is well suited to disputes
in which the parties need an expert opinion .. . If such a case went to trial, each side
would present experts to testify .. .and the court, which may have no expertise, would
decide the issue." Id. (quoting S. Sorton Jones, International Arbitration, 8 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMIP. L. REv. 213, 214 (1985)).
289 WIPO, supra note 9, at 11; see also LINDSAY, supra note 284, at 131. Lindsay
notes:
[B]asic principles of fairness, requiring that 'like cases should be decided alike',
mean that a degree of consistency is highly desirable in UDRP decision-making.
Moreover, referring to earlier decisions dealing with similar facts necessarily
improves the efficiency of decision-making by removing the need for panelists [sic]
to 're-invent the wheel' for each new dispute.
Id.
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2. Awards and Damages
The panel would review the complaint and response, and submit a
decision within fourteen days of panel appointment. 290 The parties would be
notified within three days of the award and the award would be effective ten
days after the decision is submitted.291 If the panel decided against fair use,
the respondent would be obliged to pay a set amount of statutory damages
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c),292 Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement. 293 As enumerated in this section of the Copyright Act, the
panel may increase the award of statutory damages if the respondent's
infringement was willful. 294 The panel may also reduce the damages
considerably if they find that the infringer was not aware that their use
constituted a copyright infringement. 295 The payment of damages by the
infringer is an appropriate response because allowing the unauthorized use to
proceed, without compensating the copyright owner, would discourage artists
from creating work that would be infringed without any repercussions. 296
Likewise, if the panel decides for fair use, the complainant would be obliged
to pay a set amount of statutory damages following a similar framework
including distinguishing the damages based upon willfulness. 297
3. Judicial Appeals
Similar to the UDRP, there would be a right to appeal to the courts,
however, it will be limited to appealing the procedure, not the substance of
290 WIPO, supra note 9, at 8.
291 Id. at 14.
292 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
293 Nimmer, supra note 246, at 21; see also CAPPER, supra note 248, at 114 (noting
that "[a]n order for the payment of money by one party to another is the most common
remedy found in awards. The payment may represent compensation for losses
suffered... ").
294 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
295 Id.
296 Cotter, supra note 22, at 1293-94. The award of statutory damages would not
follow the UDRP procedure. The difference is attributed to the subject matter of the two
acts. Statutory damages are a more appropriate remedy for disputes involving art than
they are for domain name disputes.
297 Nimmer, supra note 246, at 21.
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the decision.298 This is the method that is utilized by the movie and television
industries. 299 The court in Ferguson v. Writers Guild ofAmerica stated:
[The] limited scope of review is similar to that employed in judicial review
of more traditional arbitrations. There the court does not review the merits
of the arbitrators' award; it examines only whether the parties in fact agreed
to submit their controversy to arbitration, whether the procedures employed
deprived the objecting party of a fair opportunity to be heard, and whether
the arbitrators exceeded their powers.300
The DRPVA would utilize a similar method where a party could appeal
to courts, but only for a procedural review. The substance of the arbitral
award would not be an issue for the courts. Similar to the movie and
television industries, disputes over the fair use of fine art would be
nonjusticiable. Instead, the panel of experts would be able to handle the
disputes "more skillfully, more expeditiously, and more
economically ... than courts."301 Courts would defer to the decision of the
arbitral panel because of its "expertise in the interpretation and application
of' 302 the fair use factors to fine art.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial application of the fair use doctrine as it applies to visual arts,
particularly appropriation art, has not provided consistent case law usable by
artists. Part of the reason for the inconsistency is a lack of understanding and
application of the history of art to the analysis of copyright infringement and
the fair use defense. This disconnect between copyright law and art norms
can be bridged by the establishment of an arbitral procedure that would enlist
decisionmakers with expertise in the visual arts. Using the UDRP as a model
for the visual arts, the fair use doctrine as it applies to art would become
consistent, transparent, and easy for potential users to apply.
The standards established by the arbitral panel would be sensitive to the
intricacies and particulars of the art industry. The history of the creation of
art, rather than the courts, should determine when an artist has successfully
298 See note 256 supra for the discussion of how the Writers Guild uses a similar
process.
299 Ferguson v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
300Md. at 1389.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 1390.
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created an original work of art. An arbitral panel would recognize and protect
the reality that appropriation is often an element of the artistic process. A fair
use arbitral panel for the visual arts would be best suited to work in tandem
with copyright law to provide fair use guidance and to protect artists'
exclusive rights in their copyrighted work, while at the same time promoting
and encouraging the progress of the useful arts.
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